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Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul Technical University
My paper aims to account for the possibility of disagreements concerning what we
know; for clearly, people disagree about what they know. More precisely, my goal
is to explain how a contextualist theory of knowledge attributions can explain the
existence of disagreement among speakers. My working hypothesis is that genuine
epistemic disagreement is possible only under the assumption that the meaning of
the word ‘knowledge’ is governed by contexts that are objective, in the sense that
that the content of the word ‘knowledge’ is xed for all speakers sharing a common
conversational goal. e paper is divided into two sections. In the rst section, I
explain why current versions of epistemic contextualism cannot account for epis-
temic disagreement. In the second section, following Christopher Gauker’s theory
of linguistic communication, I oer my own contextualist solution to the problem
of epistemic disagreement.
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1. e Problem
Notoriously, many linguistic expressions are context sensitive. For example,
demonstratives like ‘this’ are context sensitive. ‘is’ refers to dierent things
in dierent contexts of use. Accordingly, if uttered in dierent contexts, both
sentences ‘this is red’ and ‘this is not red’ might be true. Gradable adjectives,
such as ‘tall’, are also context sensitive. For instance the claim that John is
tall might be true relative to his friends, but false relative to the average bas-
ketball player. Accordingly, if uttered in dierent contexts, both sentences
‘John is tall’ and ‘John is not tall’ might be true. ‘Everybody’ is context sen-
sitive as well. If I claim in front of my classroom that everybody is present,
then my claim might be true even if the Queen of England is not among
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my students. Finally, according to epistemic contextualism, ‘knowledge’ is
context sensitive too. us, if uttered in dierent contexts, both sentences
‘John knows that themuseum is open’ and ‘John does not know that themu-
seum is open’ might be true. Following David Kaplan’s distinction between
character and content (see Kaplan 1989), the epistemic contextualist believes
that sentences containing ‘knowledge’ have a xed character, but they might
have dierent contents, and therefore might express dierent propositions
depending upon the context of use.
Epistemic contextualism comes in dierent versions depending upon
one’s favorite linguistic model. In short, for Stewart Cohen (1986, 1999),
since knowledge implies justication and justication comes in degrees, the
context sensitivity of ‘knowledge’ ought to be understood in terms of the
context sensitivity of gradable adjectives, such as ‘tall’, ‘at’, ‘bald’, ‘rich’. In
contrast, for David Lewis (1996), since ⌜knowledge that p⌝ implies the elimi-
nation of all the possibilities inwhich ∼p is true and ‘all’ is typically restricted
to a particular domain, the context sensitivity of ‘knowledge’ ought to be un-
derstood in terms of the context sensitivity of quantied expressions, for ex-
ample ‘all’ or ‘every’. Finally, for Keith DeRose (1992), the context sensitivity
of ‘knowledge’ is like the context sensitivity of core indexicals (for example,
‘here’) or demonstratives (for example, ‘this’).
Depending upon their linguistic model, dierent epistemic contextu-
alists postulate dierent context-shiing mechanisms. For Cohen what
changes from one context to another is the threshold for justication that the
putative knower’s belief must reach in order for his or her belief to count as
justied, and, if true, as knowledge. So, for example, in the context of philo-
sophical reection, for Cohen, I (the putative knower) would not know that
I have hands because my belief would not meet the threshold for justica-
tion imposed by the skeptic. In contrast, for Lewis, what changes from one
context to another is the set of relevant alternatives that the putative knower
must be able to eliminate in order to count as knowing the proposition in
question. So, according to Lewis, in the context of philosophical reection,
I would not know that I have hands because I would not be able to rule out
the alternative that I am a brain in a vat.1 Finally, for DeRose (1992), what
changes from one context to another is the strength of epistemic position that
is required in order for the putative knower to count as knowing the propo-
sition in question. So, according to DeRose, in the context of philosophical
reection, I would not know that I have hands because I would be incapable
of tracking the truth of the proposition ‘I have hands’ all the way up into the
sphere of mere logical possibilities. In fact, in a context where skepticism
1 As Lewis concisely puts it, in the context of philosophical reection, epistemology robs us
of our knowledge (Lewis 1996, 550).
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is under examination, I might rightly believe that I have hands, but I would
fail to know it because I would continue to believe that I have hands even if
I were a brain in a vat.2
In any case, in spite of their dierences, all epistemic contextualists be-
lieve that speakers (or more precisely, knowledge attributors) impose their
epistemic standards on putative knowers.3 In addition, they also tend (more
or less explicitly) to assume that the meaning of ‘knowledge’ (or more pre-
cisely, its content) is determined by the attributors’ mental states (i.e. by the
attributor’s semantic intentions and beliefs). As Jason Stanleywrites, accord-
ing to the contextualist, “what determines the semantic value of instances of
‘knows that p’, relative to a context of use, is some collection of facts about
the intentions and beliefs of the conversational participants [knowledge at-
tributors] in that context of use” (Stanley 2005, 23). Accordingly, if follow-
ing Lewis, we assume that ⌜knowledge that p⌝ implies the elimination of
every [relevant] alternative in which ∼p, then “the mysterious distinction
between relevant and irrelevant alternatives can be grounded in a psycho-
logical distinction between what is salient to a speaker versus what is not
salient to a speaker, a distinction already independently required in the study
of context-sensitivity” (Stanley 2005, 20).4
But if we assume that the content of ‘knowledge’ is “personally indicated”,
as DeRose (2009, 133–135) likes to put it, then speakers might not be able to
disagree even when they take themselves to contradict each other. In fact, if
speakers have dierent relevant alternatives inmind, then genuine epistemic
disputes can be reduced to mere verbal disputes, precisely as Cohen seems
to be suggesting in the following passage:
2 For critical discussions of the dierent versions of epistemic contextualism, see (Blaauw
2005) and (Schaer 2005). In the case of DeRose, Schaer correctly notes that “no linguis-
tically general parameter has been identied [in connection with our ability to track the
truth], much less one associated with expressions of which ‘know’ is an instance. ere
seems to be no precedent for this form of parameter in the language. It seems a pure in-
vention” (Schaer 2005, 123). In fact, DeRose’s idea that knowledge varies according to the
strength of epistemic position and that the context sensitivity of knowledge resembles the
context sensitivity of indexicals are wholly unrelated.
3 Granted that some philosophers (Michael Williams, for example) call themselves “contex-
tualists” but hold that knowledge attributions are governed by the context of the putative
knower, as opposed to the context of the attributor.
4 It is true that some of Lewis’s rules in “Elusive Knowledge” (1996) appear to be independent
of the speaker’s mental states. But thismight be only supercially the case. Take the Rule of
Actuality: “. . . the possibility that actuality obtains is never properly ignored” (Lewis 1996,
554). Actuality is certainly amind independent feature of reality. But this rule is just a fancy
way to say that “only what is true is known” (Lewis 1996, 554), which something that has
no particular bearing on epistemic contextualism. In other words, the Rule of Actuality is
not a context sensitive rule.
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Compare ‘know’ with a term like ‘at’. Attributions of atness can
vary in truth value depending on what standards are applied. I may
look out my window and claim that New Jersey is hilly whereas a gi-
ant may assess New Jersey as at. Each claim can be correct. ere
is no contradiction, since the contexts of attribution yields dierent
standards. Surely I would not want to claim that what the giant says
is false owing to his distorted perspective, or my claim that the road
is at would be subject to the same assessment by an ant-sized being.
All of this is familiar enough. Again it is important to see that neither
we nor the giant are constrained to use specic standards. I could
adopt the giant’s standards and agree with him by truthfully stating
that New Jersey is at (Cohen 1986, 580).
But now consider the following epistemic dispute: John and Mary are
planning a trip to Egypt and their travel agent (Mike) informs them that they
do not need a visa to visit that country. On their way home, John attempts to
reassureMary and accordingly, he claims: “Mike knows thatwe donot need a
visa to enter Egypt”; butMarywho is thinking about Egypt’s current political
situation, and consequently, about the possibility of a more restrictive law,
replies: “Mike does not know that we do not need a visa for our trip”.
In this case, it seems to me that John and Mary (the attributors) have
a genuine disagreement concerning Mike’s epistemic status, and therefore,
that they are contradicting each other. However, if, following current epis-
temic contextualism, we assume that the content of ‘knowledge’ is personally
indicated, then we should conclude that they are both right (or that their
claims are truth-valueless).5 In fact, if we assume that during their conver-
sation John andMary are in dierentmental states, thenwe should conclude
that they are not using ‘knowledge’ with the same content, and accordingly,
that they do not have a genuine disagreement. So, suppose thatMike is right
about the visa, but also that he would not be able to rule out the possibility
entertained by Mary. In this case, John’s assertion that Mike has knowledge
is true. Aer all, John is not contemplating the possibility of a more restric-
tive law. But also Mary’s assertion that Mike does not have knowledge is
true. In fact, Mike would not be able to rule out the possibility of a new
more restrictive law.
Now, suppose that during his conversation with Mary, thanks to a se-
ries of conversational maneuvers (for which DeRose provides no account),6
John succeeds in putting in place his personally indicated content for knowl-
edge. (In other words, suppose that somehow John manages to impose his
5 is last one is the solution that DeRose would seem to favor, see (DeRose 2009, chapter
4).
6 See (DeRose 2009, 133).
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epistemic standards upon Mary). Now that we have shared epistemic stan-
dards (or a single scoreboard semantics, in DeRose’s terminology), we can
make room for disagreement. But since John’s standards are more relaxed
than Mary’s, we should conclude that John is right and Mary is wrong. But
this is a mistake. Since John is neglecting the current political situation in
Egypt, we should conclude that Mary is right and John is wrong. But this is
a result that DeRose cannot deliver.
I am a contextualist about ‘knowledge’. More precisely, like Lewis, I be-
lieve that knowledge is a modal notion7 that requires a distinction between
possibilities that are contextually relevant (relevant alternatives) and possi-
bilities that are contextually irrelevant. In other words, I believe that the
meaning of the word ‘knowledge’, or more precisely its content, is deter-
mined by a set of possibilities; that such possibilities vary across conver-
sational contexts; and nally, that a subject X knows that p only if he or she
can rule out the possibilities in question in which ∼p. However, I do not
think that current versions of epistemic contextualism (including Lewis’s)
can properly handle cases of disagreement.
In “Isere a Good Objection to Contextualism to be Found in its In-
ability to Handle Cases of Disagreement?” (DeRose 2009, 151–152), DeRose
himself acknowledges the problem of disagreement as follows: “presumably,
there is some correct solution to these problems—unless you want to deny
that there are any context-sensitive terms” (DeRose 2009, 152).
DeRose is right; there is a solution to the problem of disagreement, but
his move is merely rhetorical. First, he correctly traces the problem of epis-
temic disagreement back to disagreement involving other context sensitive
terms (see DeRose 2009, 143),8 but then instead of tackling it, he brushes
it aside. In fact, he seems to believe that since the problem encompasses
all context sensitive expressions, it is not an urgent threat to his account of
knowledge attributions: “Are there any special problems that arise for con-
textualism about ‘know(s)’ in these situations? If not, there does not seem
to be much of an objection to epistemic contextualism to be found here”
(DeRose 2009, 152). But in this way he leaves a formidable weapon in the
hands of the invariantist:9 since disagreements about knowledge attribu-
tions do not pose any challenge to invariantist accounts of ‘knowledge’, the
invariantist can use these problems to neutralize contextualism.
7 For a discussion of the connections between epistemic contextualism and formal epistemol-
ogy see (Hendricks 2006). In particular, in chapter ve, Hendricks systematically explores
the connections between Lewis’s epistemic contextualism and modal epistemology.
8 DeRose uses the term ‘here’, but ‘all’ would have been more appropriate.
9 Notoriously, amodal invariantist believes that there exists only one single set of possibilities
that governs all knowledge attributions.
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In any case, the right solution does not consist in denying the existence
of context sensitive expressions (nobody would do that), nor in denying the
context sensitivity of ‘knowledge’ (as the invariantist would do), but it de-
pends upon a revision of how context sensitive expressions in general acquire
their meaning.
2. e Solution
Consider the following case involving the context sensitive expression ‘all’:
Suppose that Suzy is sitting on the oor in her bedroom playing with
glass marbles. All of the marbles in Suzy’s room belong to Suzy, and
some of them are red. Suddenly Tommy comes into Suzy’s room and
declares in a loud voice, “All of the red ones are mine!” As a matter
of fact, when Tommy says this he is thinking of the marbles in his
own room. e proposition he is expressing is the proposition that
all of the red marbles in his room are his. Tommy is very proud of
his possessions and on this occasion is exulting in his possession of
red marbles. But there is no way Suzy could know that. She would
naturally expect that he was talking about the marbles there on the
oor in plain view of both of them. So of course she retorts, “No
they’re not!” (Gauker 2003, 78).
Is Suzy right or wrong? If you believe that the content of ‘all’ is relative to
what Suzy has in mind when she claims ‘No, they’re not!’, then you would
conclude that she is right. Aer all, she has inmind themarbles on the oor,
and the marbles on the oor belong to her. But for the same reasons, you
should conclude that Tommy is also right. Aer all, he has in mind the mar-
bles in his room, and the marbles in his room belong to him. Alternatively,
if you believe that the primary function of linguistic communication is to
become acquainted with other people’s mental states, then you should con-
clude that Tommy is right and Suzy is wrong. Aer all, Suzy fails to recognize
what Tommy has in mind. Given the presence of red marbles on the oor,
shemight be excused for her failure to read Tommy’s mental state. But, from
the fact that her assertionmight have been justied, we should not infer that
it was also true.
In any case, this is all wrong. In fact, there is a distinction between
what Tommy means and what he actually says given the context in which
he speaks. But once we consider the actual context in which the conversa-
tion takes place, we are bound to acknowledge that since Tommy, in contrast
to Suzy, disregards what is objectively relevant in light of their surroundings,
he is the one who is mistaken, and not Suzy. In other words, since Tommy
is wrong about the context that truly pertains to his conversation with Suzy,
he might very well be aware of what he means, but he is not aware of what
he says.
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According to Gauker (2003), philosophers are generally mistaken about
Tommy and Suzy. In fact, since they wrongly tend to assume that the main
purpose of linguistic communication is to share thoughts, they also believe
thatmeanings are “in the head”.10 However, if in contrast to them, we assume
that the main purpose of linguistic communication is not to share thoughts,
but to achieve practical goals,11 and accordingly, that the content of context
sensitive expressions depends upon the best way to achieve the goals of the
conversation, then we can better account for a wide variety of linguistic phe-
nomena, including, as we shall presently see, epistemic disagreements.12
If the context that governs a conversation depends upon how the world
really is, relative to a conversational goal, then since speakers might be mis-
taken about the world, it follows that speakers might be also mistaken about
the context that truly governs their conversation. Accordingly, we can draw a
distinction between the context that truly pertains to a conversation (the ob-
jective context),13 and what each speaker takes to be the context that pertains
to his or her conversation. is implies that, depending upon their con-
versational goals, dierent conversations are governed by dierent objective
contexts, and that for each conversation, there exists a specic objective con-
text that governs it and that speakers might fail to grasp. Ultimately, it is the
objective context that allows for the possibility of disagreement (and as long
as speakers share similar goals, they do not even have to take part to the same
conversation in order to be in disagreement). In fact, even if all speakers are
mistaken about the context that truly governs their conversation, what they
actually say depends upon it.
It could be objected that since the goals of the conversation are deter-
mined by the speakers’ desires, the content of ‘knowledge’ must ultimately
depend upon the speakers’ mental states. But this would be a mistake: from
10is is reminiscent of semantic externalism, but for reasons that I cannot properly address
in this paper, inWordsWithout Meaning, Gauker prefers to “abandon all theoretical use of
the concept of content” (Gauker 2003, 283), and thereforemeaning.
11 To clarify, I do not intend to deny a role for the notion of ‘understanding’. In a sense,
understanding is prior to action. In fact, in order to use language to achieve practical
goals, people must be able to understand each other. In other words, in order to act upon
somebody else’s assertion, a person needs to understand the assertion in question. But this
does not contradict the claim that the primary function of language is to achieve practical
goals. Sometimes, when the conversational goal in question is purely intellectual, we speak
just to share our thoughts. But when the conversational goal in question is practical, then
we speak to achieve the conversational goal and not just to share our thoughts.
12 InWordsWithout Meaning (2003), Gauker successfully applies his contextualist semantics
to a wide variety of linguistic phenomena, including demonstratives, conditionals, quan-
tiers and belief attributions.
13 Following Gauker (2003), I will assume that objective contexts are theoretical entities like
models in formal logic.
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the fact that the speakers’ goals depend upon their desires, we should not
infer that the content of the word they use is determined by their mental
states, as opposed to the best way to achieve their conversational goals. So,
if we assume that Tommy and Suzy share a common conversational goal
(establish the owner of the marbles) and accordingly, that their conversa-
tion is governed by an objective context, then even if Suzy is thinking about
her marbles and Tommy about hismarbles, they are using the word ‘all’ in-
tersubjectively (in the sense that what they are saying may be evaluated in
light of objective features of the situation in which they speak). In fact, if
throughout their conversation, the content of the word ‘all’ remains xed
by the marbles in their surroundings, we can make room for disagreement
between the two. Likewise, if we assume that John and Mary in my previ-
ous example share a common conversational goal (establishMike’s epistemic
status for the purpose of their trip) and accordingly, that their conversation
is governed by an objective context, we can account for their disagreement
as well.
In a conversational context where the ultimate goal is to enter Egypt,
John and Mary must, among other things, establish the epistemic status of
their travel agent (Mike) for the purpose of their trip. But in order to prop-
erly evaluate Mike’s epistemic status, they need to take into account the cur-
rent political situation in Egypt. Given the recent events, it is fair to assume
that the objective context that governs their conversation does contain the
possibility that due to a new law, they might require a visa to enter the coun-
try. In other words, in their conversational context, this possibility is a rel-
evant alternative. Accordingly, Mike knows that they do not require a visa
only if he can rule it out. Now, suppose that Mike is right, in the sense that
they do not require a visa, but that he would not be able to rule out the pos-
sibility of a new more restrictive law. In this case, John is wrong and Mary
is right. As we saw, John, in contrast to Mary, is not taking into account
the possibility in question, but since that possibility belongs to the context
that governs his conversation with Mary, it contributes to determining the
content of the word ‘knowledge’ as used by both Mary and John throughout
their conversation.
So although John and Mary share the same conversational goals, and
accordingly, their use of ‘knowledge’ is governed by same context, John’s take
on the objective context that governs his conversationwithMary is decient.
John (like Mary) knows that he is trying to establish Mike’s epistemic status
for the purpose of a trip to Egypt, but since (unlikeMary) he neglects Egypt’s
current political situation, he does not know which possibilities Mike must
be able to rule out in order to have knowledge. Accordingly, he attributes to
Mike the wrong epistemic status.
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So, if we consider the possibility that context sensitive expressions, in-
cluding ‘knowledge’, owe their semantic value to non-mental facts, then we
can easily account for disagreement within the boundaries of a contextual-
ist epistemology. In fact, if the content of the word ‘knowledge’ is governed
by objective contexts, then speakers can disagree about what people know.
In other words, if the content of the word ‘knowledge’ is xed for all speak-
ers sharing a common conversational goal, then sentences of the form ⌜X
knows that p⌝ and ⌜X does not know that p⌝ turn out to be contradictory.
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